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INTRODUCTION

In February 1986 the United States Supreme Court in Fisher
v. Berkeley' upheld the validity of a municipal rent control ordinance against a contention that the Sherman Act preempted the
ordinance. In an eight-to-one decision, the Court effectively gave
the coup de grace to its earlier attempt to apply the federal antitrust laws to municipalities and political subdivisions. It also may
have finally ended the remarkable series of disingenuous state-action decisions that had become an almost regular part of the
Court's calendar since Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar' in 1975.
Fisherholds a promise of restoring to the state-action exemption a
simplicity and predictability not seen since Parker v. Brown.3
This Article examines the origin, history, and scope of the
state-action doctrine of federal antitrust law-a doctrine exempting state legislation and other (generally regulatory) activity from
invalidation by the federal antitrust laws. The Article describes the
ways in which the Court increasingly confused and elaborated that
doctrine. The Article examines in particular how the Court's recent
decisions involving the relation of federal antitrust law to municipal legislation spun a web of confusion and uncertainty from which
the Court itself has been forced to withdraw; how the lower federal
courts refused to apply the Court's state-action precedents with
which they disagreed; and how even the Congress was provoked
into action to undo some of the uncertainties engendered by these
decisions. The examination of the state-action doctrine attempts to
identify the concerns underlying the Court's recent state-action decisions and to show why the series of state-action decisions since
1975 has been a failure. The Article also attempts to delineate the
proper reach of federal antitrust law and to provide a reasoned basis for its conclusions. The analysis includes an assessment of
Fisher v. Berkeley and its ramifications for the relation between
federal antitrust law and the regulatory laws of states and local
governments. Finally, the Article proposes legislation that provides
an optimum reconciliation of the free market policies underlying
the federal antitrust laws and the internal governing autonomy to
which the states are entitled.
1. 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986).
2.
3.

421 U.S. 773 (1975).
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND

A.

Parker v. Brown

The modern state-action exemption began with the Court's
1943 decision in Parker v. Brown.4 In Parker a producer and
packer of raisins brought suit to enjoin the California State Director of Agriculture and other officials from enforcing the California
Agricultural Prorate Act against him. The California act had established a cartel-like mechanism to govern the marketing of certain
crops and thus interfered with the plaintiff's desire to sell his own
raisin crop. The plaintiff initially based his challenge to the California act on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
but the Supreme Court, reviewing the case on appeal, called for
arguments on the application of the Sherman Act to the plaintiff's
claim to be free from state marketing controls. 5 When it decided
the case, however, the Court rejected all the plaintiff's challenges
to the prorate act, including the challenge based upon the Sherman Act. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Stone asserted that
the Sherman Act's purpose "was to suppress combinations to restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals and
corporations" and was not "to restrain -a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature."
In subsequent cases the Court broadened the state-action doctrine to embrace more than this superficially simple dichotomy between state and individual action. Indeed, the Court experienced
difficulty in applying even that distinction. In Parker itself Chief
Justice Stone added an element of complexity to the distinction
when he observed that "we have no question [in this case] of the
state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade."' 7 Stone's
4. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
5. See the discussion of the Parkerv. Brown litigation in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 586-88 (1976).
6. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
7. 317 U.S. at 351-52. A municipality's participation in a private agreement violating
the antitrust laws would have involved more than the issue of preemption. It would have
exposed the municipality to liability in damages for violating the antitrust laws. A claim of
municipal violation of the antitrust laws raises complex questions involving the relationship
between legislators and their constituents under the so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676 (1965), see also Westborough Mall, Inc.
v. City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., 693 F.2d 733, 743-46 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.,
Drury v. Westborough Mall, Inc., 461 U.S. 945 (1983). If the legislators themselves and other
officials are named defendants, the claim of municipal violation may also involve issues of
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words intimated that the state action held to be lawful in Parker
should be distinguished from essentially private action under a
state mantle, which apparently would not be immunized against
Sherman Act attack.
B. Schwegmann
Between 1943, when Parker was decided, and the 1970s the
Court only once found a conflict between the Sherman Act and
state legislation.8 In Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers
Corp.' the Court invalidated the nonsigner provisions of the Louisiana Fair Trade Law as inconsistent with the Sherman Act. Under
the prevailing Miller-Tydings Act 10 the Sherman Act's normal condemnation of vertical price maintenance agreements' did not apply to the resale of branded products subject to interbrand competition in a state whose laws authorized those agreements. The
Louisiana statute at issue in Schwegmann contained not only provisions authorizing such vertical price maintenance agreements,
but it also contained a so-called "nonsigner" provision. The nonsigner provision forbade all dealers in the state from reselling a
branded product for less than the price specified in a vertical price
maintenance contract between the supplier and any of its dealers.
The plaintiffs, out-of-state suppliers, had entered into fair
trade contracts with some Louisiana retailers. The defendant was a
discount retailer who refused to enter into a resale price maintenance contract and who sold the plaintiff's brands of liquor at cutrate prices. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant retailer
under the Louisiana nonsigner provisions from selling below the
official immunity. See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1568
(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Gulf Coast Cable Television Co. v. Affiliated Capital
Corp., 106 S. Ct. 788 (1986). The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98544, 98 Stat. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, has reduced, but not
eliminated, the circumstances in which a local government may be exposed to antitrust
liability in damages.
8. In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966), the Court
addressed a claim that a New York law requiring that the sales price of liquor to New York
dealers be the lowest price at which the seller had sold anywhere in the United States
during the previous month was in conflict with the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman
Act. The Court, however, stated that it could see no potential conflict with the Sherman Act
and that conflict with the Robinson-Patman Act was too speculative to condemn the New
York law. Id. at 45-46.
9. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
10. 50 Stat. 693 (1937) amended by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1, (1982)).
11. Vertical price maintenance agreements have been treated as illegal per se under
the Sherman Act. See Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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price fixed in the plaintiffs' outstanding fair trade contracts. Although the Miller-Tydings Act exempted only vertical price maintenance agreements from the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs argued
that the nonsigner provision of the Louisiana law needed no such
exemption because the nonsigner provisions operated in situations
in which no agreements had been entered. 2 Indeed, the plaintiffs
based their case on the command of the state operating through
the nonsigner provision of the Act rather than on an individual
agreement. The Court, however, took a radically different view of
the Louisiana statute than did the plaintiffs. By compelling "retailers to follow a parallel price policy," the Louisiana statute, according to Justice Douglas, "demand[ed] private conduct which
the Sherman Act forbids."' Under this rationale the Court declared the Louisiana nonsigner provision invalid as conflicting with
the Sherman Act.
C. The Case Law of the 1970s and 1980s
Beginning in 1970s, after a two-decade absence from the
Court's agenda,' 4 the state-action exemption came before the
Court with troublesome frequency. The Court has attempted to
describe the parameters of the state-action doctrine in eleven cases
in the last eleven years.' 5 The very number of these cases demonstrates the Court's inability to articulate stable and predictable criteria governing the state-action exemption. 6 Not until it had
struggled through the first five of these cases was the Court able in
its 1980 decision in CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Association v.
12. 341 U.S. at 387.

13. 341 U.S. at 389. The Court described the Louisiana Act as driving nonsigning
retailers "into a compact" involving horizontal price fixing. Id.
14. In Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 268, 284-85 (1972), the Court rejected an antitrustbased challenge to baseball's reserve system by following its prior rulings in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,
346 U.S. 356 (1953), that baseball was exempt from the federal antitrust laws. The Court

also affirmed rulings below that state antitrust law could not be applied to baseball.
15. Fisher v. Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,
105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 105 S.
Ct. 1721 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S.Ct. 1989 (1984); Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. of California v. Orrin W. Fox
Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
16. See, e.g., Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Forward:The Time Chart of the
Justices,73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 96-98 (1959); see also Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process
of Social Change, 19 STAN L. REv. 786, 815 (1967).
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Midcal Aluminum, Inc.'7 to state succinctly apparently workable
standards for applying the state-action doctrine. 18 Yet even as the
Court consolidated its state-action precedents to form a doctrine,
the Court had already begun unraveling the doctrine when in 1978
it launched an antitrust attack against anticompetitive actions by
municipalities and other political subdivisions. 9
D.

Three Kinds of State-Action Cases

The Court's state-action decisions fall into a number of overlapping groups. Into one group fall those decisions in which the
defense of otherwise unlawful trade restraints imposed or approved
by a state agency rests on the attribution of these restraints to the
state. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar20 is such a case. In Goldfarb
the state bar association defended its price fixing activities as state
action. Although the bar did perform some official functions, the
Court held the bar's price fixing activities not to fall within the
scope of its official authorization. In a second group of cases the
validity of a state statute is attacked on the ground that it has
been preempted by the Sherman Act. Midcal2 ' and Schwegmann22
fall within this group. A third group of cases is a subclass of the
last group; in these cases a municipality's anticompetitive legislation or other behavior is challenged as preempted by the Sherman
Act because the municipality does not act under the umbrella of a
state economic policy. Cases in this last group include City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,23 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,2 4 and Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire.25 Although the Court's decisions and consequent elaborations of the state-action doctrine's content are the product of an
evolutionary growth, they can be analyzed best in the conceptual
framework sketched above.
17. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
18. Reviewing its prior decisions, the Court in Midcal concluded that they established
two standards for application of the state-action exemption from the federal antitrust laws:
"First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy'; second the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself." Id. at
105.
19. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
20. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).

21. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
22.
23.
24.

25.

341 U.S. 384 (1951).
435 U.S. 389 (1978).
455 U.S. 40 (1982).

105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
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1. The First Group of State-Action Cases: When is the Action
of a State Agency Properly Attributable to the "State"?
In Goldfarb the Court examined the role the state bar played
in establishing and enforcing a schedule of legal fees and found
that the bar's price fixing activities were not compelled by the
state. 2e In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co 27 an electric utility pro-

vided replacement light bulbs without separate charge to residential customers pursuant to a provision in the rate schedule that it
filed with the state public service commission. Although the governing state law obliged the utility to behave in accordance with its
rate schedule, the Court ruled that the utility had participated sufficiently in the formulation of the tariff to make the subjection of
the utility to the antitrust laws not "unfair. ' 2 8 The Court further
ruled that the light bulb distribution program had been approved
only in a pro forma way by the state and its public service commission. In short, no authentic state policy protected the light bulb
distribution program. In reaching that result and consequently
subjecting the utility's light bulb distribution program to the antitrust laws, however, the Court was unable to summon a majority
for an opinion, and the several Justices issued a total of four plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. The same issue arose in
Hoover v. Ronwin,29 in which an antitrust action was brought
against the members of the Arizona Supreme Court's Committee
on Examinations and Admissions for allegedly unduly restricting
entry into the practice of law. In Hoover the Court ruled that because the Committee performed an advisory role to the Arizona
Supreme Court, the suit properly was characterized as one against
the state. That determination resolved the issue of whether the
challenged action was individual or state action. Nonetheless, the
Court, speaking through Justice Powell, cautioned that for cases in
which parties other than the legislature or the state supreme court
carry out market restricting activity, "[c]loser analysis is required"30 into the authorization or approval of the restriction by
the state legislature or supreme court. The Court, as will be shown
below, has not worked out adequate standards for this "closer
analysis."
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

421
428
428
104
104

U.S. at 791-92.
U.S. 579 (1976).
U.S. at 595.
S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
S. Ct. at 1995.
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The Second Group of State-Action Cases: Antitrust
Challenges to State Legislation

The state-action cases in which an antitrust attack has been
mounted against a state statute or regulatory scheme include the
following: Parker v. Brown,3 1 Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert
Distillers Corp.,3 2 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,3 3 New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,-4 and California
Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc."5 The
Court held that the challenged legislation was protected by the
state-action doctrine in each of these cases except Schwegmann
and Midcal, both of which involved state fair trade laws. Midcal
established the Court's standards for governing the applicability of
the state-action doctrine to state statutes or regulations challenged
as inconsistent with the federal antitrust laws.
(a) The Background to Midcal
Until its 1980 decision in Midcal, the Court made little attempt to reconcile its state-action decisions. The Court inadequately explained both its decision in Parker upholding a stategoverned agricultural marketing mechanism and its decision in
Schwegmann striking down the nonsigner provisions of a state fair
trade law. In the five years before Midcal, the Court denied the
benefit of the state-action exemption to private parties that
claimed to be acting for the state in Goldfarb and Cantor. During
this period the Court also limited the availability of the state-action exemption to municipalities and other political subdivisions in
City of Lafayette v. LouisianaPower & Light Co. The Court, however, rejected an antitrust challenge to a restriction upon lawyer
advertising promulgated by a state supreme court in Bates, as well
as an antitrust challenge to a state law protecting automobile dealers against intrabrand competition in New Motor Vehicle Board.
Although in the aggregate the Court's state-action decisions did
not constitute a coherent body of doctrine, the cases involving direct attacks on the validity of state legislation particularly required
reconciliation. The Court failed to explain why the cartel-like arrangements at issue in Parker and New Motor Vehicle Board
31.

317 U.S. 341 (1943).

32. 341 U.s. 384 (1951).
33.
34.
35.

433 U.S. 350 (1977).
439 U.S. 96 (1978).
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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could be protected by the state-action defense in the face of
Schwegmann's condemnation of a statute establishing a system of
vertical price maintenance.
(b) The Midcal Formulation
In Midcal the Court struck down a California law 6 establishing a system of resale price maintenance for wines. Under the California law, wine suppliers filed either a resale price maintenance
contract or a price schedule with state authorities and thereby set
the prices at which wholesalers resold their wines to retailers. The
resale prices fixed by the filing bound both signers and nonsigners.
Because the federal laws permitting states to authorize resale price
maintenance systems5 7 had been repealed by the Consumer Goods
Pricing Act of 197538 the California law was invalid under the reasoning of Schwegmann.
In striking down the California resale price maintenance law,
the Court attempted to establish a formulation of the state-action
doctrine that would reconcile its state-action decisions. Reviewing
those decisions, the Court concluded that it had established two
standards for application of the state-action doctrine: "First, the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself." 3 The Court held that the
California statute met the first standard; it was clear in its purpose
to permit resale price maintenance. But it failed to meet the second standard: "The State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established by private parties. The State neither
establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price
schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts." °
Although the clear articulation and supervision standards were
drawn from the Court's prior state-action decisions, only in Midcal
did they attain the status of sine qua nons for application of the
state-action defense. Despite the new importance of the standards,
however, the Court did not provide an adequate rationale for them
in Midcal. Even so, it was no mean task for the Court to formulate
36. Cal. Bus & Prof. Code §§ 24752, 24862, 24864-24866, 24880 (repealed 1980).
37. See McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 632 (1952); repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of
1975, 89 Stat. 801; Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), repealed by Consumer Pricing
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801 (codified 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
38. Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
39. 445 U.S. at 105.
40. Id. at 105-06.
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criteria that, even on a technical level, could reconcile all of its
prior state-action case law. Moreover, Midcal is significant not
only as the Court's first attempt to reconcile and summarize its
prior state-action decisions; Midcal has remained a significant precedent because its standards have continued, at least formally, to
govern the application of the state-action doctrine.4
(c) The Derivation of a Rationale for Midcal
The two tests adopted in Midcal for application of the stateaction doctrine had appeared in the prior case law as factors for
testing the responsibility of the state for challenged market restraints. The first Midcal requirement of "clear articulation" had
been used in cases in which private parties attempted to shelter
their anticompetitive behavior under the protective umbrella of
state authorization4 2 or in which political subdivisions asserted
that their ordinances were expressions of state policy.43 These
cases raise issues of authority: did the state properly authorize the
market restraints under challenge? The Court probably adopted
the clear articulation requirement at least in part to facilitate judicial resolution of the authority question. The second Midcal requirement of state supervision seems designed to ensure that antitrust exemptions were not bestowed upon private decisionmaking.
The Court in Midcal did not explain the significance of the
two tests that it had adopted. It did not explain why a state policy
had to be "clearly" articulated or what standards would govern
compliance with this clear articulation requirement. Nor did the
Court provide a detailed explanation of why it was imposing a su41. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105
S.Ct. 1721 (1985); Massachusetts Furniture & Piano Mover's Ass'n. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 773 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1985).
42. That clear articulation requirement may have been implied in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), cases
in which the issue was whether restrictive behavior properly was attributable to private
actors or to a state. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNERt, Antitrust Law 91-92 (1978). The Court
used that phrase in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977). The basis which
Areeda and Turner gave for reading the clear articulation requirement in the Cantor opinion was the Court's insistence that an antitrust exemption could not be broader than necessary to make a system of state regulation work. That approach was explicitly repudiated in
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 1727 n.21
(1985).
43. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978),
Justice Brennan relied upon Bates as authority for the significance of a state policy "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed" and of active state supervision, the two factors that
were adopted as governing tests for application of the state-action doctrine in Midcal.

1268

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1257

pervision requirement. The Court also failed to mention that two
years before its Midcal decision, Professors Areeda and Turner
had recommended both a clear statement and a governmental supervision requirement as conditions for the application of the
state-action doctrine. 44 Areeda and Turner argued that a supervision requirement would ensure that exemptions from the Sherman
Act would be confined to those areas in which state government
exercises regulatory oversight and that private firms would not be
set free of all restraint.4 5 They argued that requiring a state legislature to state clearly when it is adopting a regulatory policy at odds
with the Sherman Act would help the federal courts to interpret
such a statute and that the requirement would reduce the chances
for error in judicial applications of the state-action exemption.46
The underlying assumption of the Midcal decision was that
almost all systems of governmental regulation needed the state-action doctrine to protect them against a federal antitrust challenge.
Some kinds of state regulation, it is true, produce only de minimis
anticompetitive effects, which may not need such protection. 4 But
because most economic regulation is inefficient and thus produces
anticompetitive effects, it needs the protection of the state-action
doctrine. This view of state regulation underlies Midcal's explanation of New Motor Vehicle Board.48 The dealer protection legislation involved in New Motor Vehicle Board survived antitrust attack while the fair trade legislation involved in Midcal did not
because the former, but not the latter, passed both of the tests
formulated in Midcal and therefore was protected by the state-action doctrine.4 9
3.

The Third Group of State-Action Cases: The Municipal
Liability Cases

Municipalities and other political subdivisions are special entities under the state-action doctrine. Until the recent decision in
Fisher v. Berkeley, 50 municipal exposure to antitrust law depended
44. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 42, at 71-92.
45. Id. at 73.
46. Id. at 91.
47. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). Compare Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966) with Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986).
48. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
49. See 445 U.S. at 105-06 & n.12.
50. 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986).
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upon whether the challenged municipal action was carried out
under a mandate from the state legislature, an issue governed by
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,51 Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder;5 and Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire.53 It has been primarily the municipal liability
cases that have exposed the Court's "clear articulation" standard
for application of the state-action doctrine as unworkable. The
municipal liability cases also demonstrate that the clear articulation standard lacks an adequate rationale. In these cases the Court
both has expanded the reach of the federal judiciary furthest into
state affairs and has met the greatest resistance. Finally, it has
been the intractability of the "clear articulation" issue that has
forced the Court to abandon its ill-fated attempt to review local
legislation for conformity with the federal antitrust laws.
(a) The Starting Point: Lafayette
In 1978, two years before its decision in Midcal, the Court began to expose municipalities to antitrust liability. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 54 the Court rejected the claim
that a municipally owned utility automatically was entitled to a
state-action defense to an antitrust claim asserted against it by an
investor owned utility. In writing the plurality opinion, however,
Justice Brennan went beyond the facts of the case to write an essay on the relationship of the state-action doctrine to
municipalities.
Justice Brennan viewed the issue of municipal exposure to
federal antitrust law as cast against a backdrop of competing policies. The national policy embodied in the Sherman Act of favoring
freely operating competitive markets had to be balanced, in Brennan's analysis, against the federal structure of the American government, in which the states were-and should be-free, within
limits, to adopt their own economic policies. Brennan would bend
the national free market policy to accommodate state decisions to
regulate particular markets. Under Justice Brennan's approach,
however, the federal antitrust laws are not so flexible as to accommodate the potentially multitudinous and inconsistent anticompetitive policies of cities.5
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

435
455
105
435
See

U.S. 389 (1978).
U.S. 40 (1982).
S.Ct. 1713 (1985).
U.S. 389 (1978).
435 U.S. at 408, 412-15. According to Brennan's formulation of the state-
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Although in his Lafayette opinion Justice Brennan made the
state-action doctrine's applicability to municipal regulatory action
turn on the question of whether the challenged municipal action
had been authorized by the state legislature, he applied federal judicial standards to the authorization question. Brennan's Lafayette opinion indicated that a state legislature's authorization had
to be specific; a general grant of power might indicate that the
state lacked a policy and was instead "neutral. 5 6 In these circumstances no "state" economic policy to which federal antitrust law
should defer would exist.
Two years after Lafayette, when a unanimous Midcal Court
reconciled and consolidated its earlier state-action holdings, the
Court reformulated Lafayette's requirement that a municipality
act pursuant to a "state" policy in displacing competition and incorporated the requirement into the first of the two Midcal tests:
the governing state policy must be one that is "clearly articulated."
This Article will demonstrate that the federal judiciary's imposition of this clear articulation standard upon the regulatory actions
of cities broke down the expansion of federal antitrust law into
state and municipal affairs.
(b) Boulder as the Peak of Federal Intervention
In its 1982 decision Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder5 7 the Court reached the apogee of its interventionist approach. The plaintiff, Community Communications Co., provided
cable television service to a part of Boulder, Colorado whose topographical configuration interfered with the reception of broadcast
television.5 8 As a result of technological developments during the
1970s, cable services became capable of supplying extensive programming. Community Communications announced plans to expand its service throughout the city to supply what it perceived to
be a new market. The city government also had become aware of
action doctrine, local units of government could claim the state-action exemption only when
they were carrying out state policy: "The Parker[state-action] doctrine, so understood, preserves to the States their freedom under our dual system of federalism to use their municipalities to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust
laws without at the same time permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's
free-market goals." Id. at 415-16.
56. 435 U.S. at 414.
57. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
58. The facts are reported in detail in Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1036-38 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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the increasing capabilities of cable television and adopted a moratorium ordinance prohibiting Community Communications from
expanding while the city sought applications from rival cable firms
for a city franchise. Community Communications, in response,
brought an antitrust claim against the city. The federal district
court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
moratorium ordinance."9 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision on the ground, inter alia, that under the homerule provisions of the state of Colorado, the city exercised the powers of the state within its boundaries."
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court ruled
that the Boulder moratorium ordinance was not entitled to the
state-action exemption. In its Boulder decision the Court used the
first of the Midcal tests to deny the moratorium ordinance the
benefit of the state-action doctrine. Writing for the Court, Justice
Brennan repeated in Boulder much of the state-action analysis
contained in his earlier Lafayette plurality opinion. In Boulder
Brennan also employed the clear articulation standard from the
Midcal reformulation. Because the city's claim to be exercising
state power arose from the home-rule provision of the state constitution, Justice Brennan was able to say that the state had no policy at all on the regulation of cable television. Although the city
indisputably was exercising state power as a matter of state law, its
action in adopting the moratorium ordinance was not carrying out
a "clearly articulated" state economic policy. The city's action
therefore failed the first of the Midcal tests.
(c) The Impact of the Boulder Decision
(1) Fears Generated by Boulder
Boulder generated widespread concern that the federal antitrust laws would be used to interfere with the ordinary functioning
of local governments. Whenever a local government ordinance imposing a significant market restraint could not claim protection
from an umbrella economic policy adopted by the state legislature,
it would be vulnerable to invalidation as inconsistent with the federal antitrust laws. Moreover, partially because Justice Brennan
wrote his Boulder opinion in the language of antitrust "exemp59. 485 F. Supp. at 1041.
60. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 707 (10th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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tion,"6'1 the case stimulated fears that cities that had enacted such
ordinances and that were held not to be entitled to the exemption
would be held to have violated the federal antitrust laws and thus
would be subject to treble-damage liability as well as to injunctive
actions.
(2) The Response of the Lower Federal Courts
The fears stimulated by the Boulder decision were largely, but
not entirely, 2 unrealized. The lower federal courts resisted the demands of the Boulder precedent. Although the courts always paid
lip service to Boulder's requirement that anticompetitive municipal regulation carry out a "clearly articulated" state economic policy, they almost invariably found the needed clearly articulated
policy, even when discovering the policy required considerable imagination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for example, went so far as to find a state policy "clearly articulated" even though the court had to "engage in some
speculation"63 to discover it.
The Eighth Circuit heavily influenced the decisions of other
lower courts. That Circuit had restated the clear articulation requirement of Boulder in its own two part test: "The legislature
61. Justice Brennan stated the issue as "whether a 'home rule' municipality ...
enjoys the 'state action' exemption from Sherman Act liability announced in Parker v.
Brown." 455 U.S. at 43. Thereafter, he employed the exemption terminology throughout his
opinion. Id. at 49, 50, 53. Brennan had previously explained that "[t]he word 'exemption'; is
commonly used by courts as a shorthand expression for Parker's holding that the Sherman
Act was not intended by Congress to prohibit the anticompetitive restraints imposed by
California in that case." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393
n.8 (1978). Justice Rehnquist in his Boulder dissent asserted that the exemption terminology was ill advised because it implied that a city could violate the antitrust laws by enacting
legislation in conflict with the Sherman Act. 455 U.S. at 60 (Brennen, J., dissenting). In the
background was the district court's ingenuity in finding that the concerted-action requirement of Sherman Act § 1 apparently had been satisfied despite an inadequate showing of
conspiracy. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035,
1039 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); see also 455
U.S. at 65 n.1.
62. Although, as the text shows, the lower federal courts often strained to find that
particular municipal enactments met the Midcal tests and were therefore protected by the
state-action exemption, there have been erratic and largely unpredictable exceptions. Compare, e.g., Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub nom., Drury v. Westborough Mall, Inc., 461 U.S. 945 (1983) with Scott v.
City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985); compare also Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983) with Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), afl'd, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
63. Central Iowa Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d
419, 426 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985).
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must have authorized the challenged activity, and it must have
done so with an intent to displace competition. 6 4 When the
Eighth Circuit applied its formulation in CentralIowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Waste Agency,6e the court
upheld the validity of a grant to a municipal waste disposal agency
of a monopoly over waste generated within metropolitan Des
Moines, even though the authorizing statutes failed to indicate
that the legislature had intended to replace the market (represented by private sanitary landfill operators) with a municipal monopoly. Applying its two part test, however, the court had no difficulty in finding that the legislature had authorized the creation of
the metropolitan waste agency. The court concluded that the Iowa
legislature placed an extremely high priority on the activities of
intergovernmental agencies like the defendant in the disposal of
solid waste."6 The court then found that the second rung of its two
part test was satisfied because "[t]he reasonable and perhaps even
inescapable conclusion" from the Iowa statutes authorizing local
governments to dispose of solid waste was that "the legislature desired agencies such as Metro to have broad discretion to do
whatever was necessary to ensure their success."6 7 Because bond
consultants had advised that a monopoly grant over solid waste
was necessary to the agency's financial success and hence to the
marketing of the bonds issued to finance the agency's facilities, the
court concluded that the monopoly was necessary and that therefore the legislature intended to displace competition with monopoly. This reasoning is tortuous at best, and how the Boulder mandate of clear articulation was met in the circumstances is hard to
68
see.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits have followed the Eighth in holding that the clear articulation requirement is met when the legislature addresses a subject
64. Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1011 (8th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1964 (1985).
65. 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1864 (1985).
66. 715 F.2d at 426.
67. Id.
68. The Eighth Circuit followed a similar route in Scott v. City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d
1207, 1211 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985). There the court upheld
the city's use of its zoning power to exclude development on the ground that the Iowa
Urban Renewal Law authorized zoning to further urban renewal. The court then relied upon
the "legislature's deep concern and broad delegation of power" to municipalities for its
conclusion that the state had authorized them to restrict competition among developers
through the zoning power. Id. at 1213.

1274

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1257

and broadly grants discretion to local governments to handle the
problem as seems best to them. The Ninth Circuit used this approach in recent cases involving the grant of municipal monopolies
over trash collection and cable television. 9 The Sixth Circuit has
used a reasonable foreseeability analysis to weaken the force of the
clear articulation requirement. In Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City
of Akron7 0 the court, over the objections of competing sanitary
landfill operators, upheld a monopoly grant over solid waste to a
public waste disposal agency because the grant (like the similar
grant in the Des Moines case7 1) had been extended on the advice
of revenue bond consultants. Although the appeals court acknowledged that "we cannot agree with the district court that the statutes governing [the Ohio Water District Authority] meet the requirement of a clear and affirmative state policy,"7 2 the court

nonetheless enlarged its search area to find the needed articulation. The court joined together the authority possessed by municipalities under Ohio law to regulate the disposal of waste and to
construct disposal facilities with the waste agency's authority to
contract with municipalities. That joinder, according to the court,
produced the needed "clearly articulated" state policy to displace
competition. At that point, however, the state policy to displace
competition was "clearly articulated" only in the eyes of the court.
The court admittedly reduced "clear articulation" to a showing of
a "reasonable" relation between the imposed municipal restraint
and a state policy to regulate solid waste. 3
As administered by the lower federal courts, the clear articulation standard became largely meaningless. Those courts tended to
find that almost all local regulation was carried out under a
"clearly articulated" state policy. Moreover, the Supreme Court's
failure to formulate an understandable rationale for the clear articulation standard provided the lower courts with no guidance on
how to apply that standard. The state-action doctrine thus became
inadministrable; it had no apparent justification, and it was perceived widely as a threat to local self-government. The Court's im69. Compare Tom Hudson & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Chula Vista, 746 F.2d 1370, 137374 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 3503 (1985) and Catlina Cablevision Assocs. v.
City of Tucson, 745 F.2d 1266, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1984) with Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646,
664 (9th Cir. 1983) and Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 726 F.2d 1430,
1433 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1865 (1985).
70. 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984).
71. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
72. 742 F.2d at 961.
73. Id. at 960-61.
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position of the clear articulation requirement to govern the relation of state to local governments was a case of judicial bungling at
its worst. The failure of this judicial policy initiative precipitated a
congressional response and retrenchment by the Court.
(3) The Response of Congress
The antitrust "exemption" language in Boulder that engendered fears of municipal exposure to treble-damage antitrust liability 7 4 provoked Congress into enacting the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984.7 That Act eliminated most of the exposure of
municipalities to antitrust damage liability. The Act, however, did
not address the exposure of municipal ordinances to invalidation
by a suit in equity.
(4) The Halie Case
The Court in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire7 e began the
painful process of retreating from the interventionist path taken in
its Lafayette and Boulder decisions. In Hatlie the Court indicated
that it no longer would use the antitrust laws to review allocations
of power between the state legislature and units of local government. The Court in Hallie (and its companion Southern Motor
CarriersRate Conference, Inc. v. United States77 ) ruled that when
a state legislature manifests an intention to impose economic regulation upon an identified area of business behavior, its economic
policy will be deemed to be "clearly articulated" within the meaning of Midcal.7 8 The Court also ruled that even when a state grants
to a municipality permissive authority to impose a specified restraint, the state will be taken to have "clearly articulated" its umbrella policy. Retreating broadly from Boulder, Justice Powell's
74. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
75. P.L. 98-544, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2750.
76. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
77. 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985).
78. See 105 S. Ct. at 1718-19. In Boulder, the city's moratorium ordinance admittedly
was authorized under state law. Yet the Court ruled that the ordinance was invalid because
the home-rule provisions of the state constitution under which the city was acting
evidenced, at most, only a policy of "neutrality" on the regulation of cable television. The
state therefore had no clearly articulated policy on cable television regulation, and the city
ordinance failed the first of the two Midcal tests. Hallie reinterpreted the concept of policy
neutrality as it appeared in Boulder to mean that when the state legislature refers to a
subject matter and commits that subject matter to local governments for discretionary regulation, the state will not be deemed to be neutral on policy. For reasons discussed below, the
importance of the Hallie revision has been diminished by Fisher v. Berkeley. See infra
notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
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opinion indicated that as long as a state legislature refers to a subject matter and commits that subject matter to local government
for discretionary regulation, the courts will not deem the state policy to be "neutral.

'7 9

The Court's basic concern was that state

goals should override "purely parochial public interests" of the local governments." Thus, the state's approval of local government
imposed market restraints obviates any need for the coherent state
economic policy that Justice Brennan apparently visualized in Lafayette and Boulder."' Hallie and its companion Southern Motor
CarriersRate Conference82 effectively adopted the delegation doctrine from administrative law as a guide to the meaning of the
state-action case law's "clear articulation" requirement. 3 If a state
legislature expresses an intent to replace the free market with regulation, it can leave to agencies or to municipalities the details of
how that replacement is carried out.
III. THE

SCOPE OF THE STATE-ACTION DOCTRINE

At the time the Court decided Midcal, it was believed widely
that the state-action doctrine was needed to protect systems of
state economic regulation that produced significant anticompetitive market effects. Because the Court previously had upheld state
legislation having only de minimis anticompetitive effects against
84
antitrust attack without reference to the state-action doctrine,
the state-action doctrine appeared to be needed as a defense only
when the anticompetitive effects were severe and market supply
was significantly restricted or the effects replicated a per se offense.85 Although most systems of state public utility regulation
would pass the two Midcal tests for protection under the stateaction doctrine, regulation administered to maximize scale econo79. See supra note 78.
80. 105 S. Ct. at 1721.
81. See 435 U.S. at 408; 455 U.S. at 56.
82. 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985).
83. In Hallie and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, the Court spoke in
language reminiscent of that employed by courts reviewing the actions of regulatory agencies: only the most basic purposes of displacing competition in a particular field with a
regulatory structure must be articulated; the regulatory details can be filled in by administering agencies, including, presumably, local governments. See 105 S. Ct. at 1731.
84. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). Compare Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966) with Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986).
85. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okl.,
468 U.S. 85, 112-114, 118-120 (1984).
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mies probably would not even have needed such protection.88
In Rice v. Norman Williams Co. 87 the Court upheld, without
direct reliance upon the state-action doctrine, a California "designation" statute s against an antitrust-based challenge. The California statute enabled a distiller to designate an exclusive California
importer of its brand of alcoholic beverages. The California legislature enacted the statute as a defense to an Oklahoma law that provided that any distiller selling to any Oklahoma wholesaler was required to sell to any other wholesaler who wished to purchase its
products. 89 Fearing that the Oklahoma law would be construed to
apply extraterritorially, the California legislature enacted its designation statute to prevent the Oklahoma statute from destroying
the ability of distillers to establish vertically restricted distribution
systems within California.
Writing for the Court in Rice, Justice Rehnquist stated:
...[A] state statute, when considered in the abstract, may be condemned
under the antitrust laws only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places
irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to
comply with the statute. Such condemnation will follow under § 1 of the
Sherman Act when the conduct contemplated by the statute is in all cases a
per se violation.' 0

Because the conduct contemplated by the California designation
statute was the distillers' imposition of vertically restricted distribution systems-systems that the Court had recognized in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.9 1 as likely to produce
procompetitive results in many circumstances-the California statute could not be condemned on its face.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rice suggests the following
classification of state statutes: (1) The first class of state statutes
are those that do not produce significant anticompetitive effects in
all cases. Within this group are statutes, like the California designation statute in Rice, that produce or are likely to produce
procompetitive effects or that impose only de minimis restraints. 92
These statutes survive a facial attack without recourse to the state86. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir.
1982).
87. 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
88. CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23672 (West Supp. 1985); see 458 U.S. at 657.
89. OKLA. STAT., tit. 37, § 533 (Supp. 1985).
90. 458 U.S. at 661.
91. 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977).
92. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
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action doctrine. (2) The second class of state statutes are those
that mandate or authorize conduct that is per se illegal under the
antitrust laws,93 but that meet the two Midcal tests and therefore
are saved from invalidation by the state-action doctrine.9 4 (3) The

third class of state statutes are those that mandate or authorize
conduct that is per se illegal under the antitrust laws and that do
not pass the Midcal tests. The federal antitrust laws preempt this
last class of state statutes. 5
The three-class framework represents the general understanding up to the time of Fisher v. Berkeley. Under this scheme most
state legislation was free from preemption by the federal antitrust
laws. By contrast, municipal legislation was significantly more vulnerable. Municipal legislation that mandated or authorized per se
illegal conduct (like state legislation of the second class above) was
preempted unless the state-action doctrine saved it. But municipal
legislation, unlike state legislation, had to pass the federal court's
evaluation of its authorization by the state legislature. Because
most of the municipal legislation challenged had been enacted
under relatively broad grants of power, it was peculiarly exposed to
invalidation under the clear articulation standard as employed in
Boulder.
The Court's most recent decision in Fisher v. Berkeley, however, drastically changed the scope of the state-action doctrine.
IV. Fisher v. Berkeley
Fisher v. Berkeley"6 involved a challenge to Berkeley, California's rent control ordinance. A rent control ordinance is a form of
maximum-price regulation, a form of market control that, when
carried out pursuant to private agreement, is per se illegal under
the Sherman Act. Under the three-class framework approach, 7
therefore, a rent control ordinance would be deemed to require
conduct that the Sherman Act forbids and would be preempted
unless protected by the state-action exemption. Under the case law
93. The assumption is that when Rehnquist spoke of a state statute mandating or
authorizing conduct that was a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, he referred to
conduct that, if performed pursuant to private agreement, would be per se illegal. See
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951).
94. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
95. See, e.g., Midcal, 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Schwegmann, 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
96. 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984), aff'd, 106 S.Ct. 1045
(1986).
97. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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prevailing at the time of Fisher, whether the California legislature
had authorized the city to impose rent control would have controlled the applicability of the state-action exemption.
The California Supreme Court refused to consider the stateaction doctrine. It took the view that the Berkeley ordinance on its
face did not conflict with the Sherman Act, and hence did not need
protection under the state-action doctrine, because the Sherman
Act was not intended to interfere with such a normal governing
function of cities as a rent control ordinance.9 8 The California
court thus effectively challenged the United States Supreme Court
to withdraw from its antitrust foray into municipal government
and indeed even to back away from the standards that the Court
had adopted for application of the state-action doctrine generally.
In earlier Supreme Court decisions, various Justices had urged
that the Midcal standards be applied directly to municipalities
and other units of local government. Justice Rehnquist, for example, had urged in Boulder that no greater inquiry should be made
into the validity of municipal legislation than into the validity of
state legislation,"9 and Justice Stewart had urged the same theory
in Lafayette.10 0 Lafayette and Boulder had limited the state-action doctrine's application to local governments by requiring, as a
precondition to protection, a judicial determination that challenged municipal legislation was carried out under a mandate from
the state legislature. The Court in Fisher,therefore, could have retreated from Lafayette and Boulder by reconsidering and adopting
the suggestions of Rehnquist and Stewart. It could have reaffirmed
the Midcal tests, but made them applicable directly to municipal
legislation. This approach would have been the most obvious line
of retreat, and the one involving the least tampering with prior decisions. It would have produced an affirmance of the California decision on different grounds than the broad one employed by the
state court.
To its credit, the Court took a broader stance. While it did not
endorse the state court's reasoning, the Court reinterpreted its own
prior case law. According to Justice Marshall's majority opinion,
neither local nor state legislation will be preempted by the Sherman Act unless the legislation involves concerted action. The
Court will consider concerted action to be present only when the
98. 37 Cal. 3d at 677, 693 P.2d at 288, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
99. 455 U.S. at 69-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. 435 U.S. at 427, (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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challenged legislation is of the so-called hybrid type involved in
Schwegmann, Midcal, and Rice. The hybrid statutes, exemplified
by the fair trade regulation of Schwegmann'01 and Midcal0 2 and
the designation statute of Rice, 0 s involve schemes in which legislation effectively empowers private parties to make decisions that
then are enforced by governmental apparatus.
A.

The Fisher Rationale

Fisher added a new element to the analysis of whether the
Sherman Act preempts nonfederal legislation. Fishertook the concerted action requirement for a violation of section one of the
Sherman Act and used it to determine the outcome of the preemption issue. This approach seems to confuse the essentials for a section one violation with the issue of whether nonfederal legislation
conflicts with the Sherman Act. The Court decided none of the
prior state-action cases on a rationale that distinguishes concerted
from unilateral action. Justice Marshall's insistence that no concerted action (and hence no preemption) occurs when a nonfederal
government compels behavior raises a new set of problems. How
nonfederal legislation that merely permits or facilitates anticompetitive behavior will fare under the new approach is unclear. Moreover, it is not obvious that the so-called hybrid category of
nonfederal legislation involves any greater degree of concerted action than a rent control ordinance like Berkeley's. The Berkeley
ordinance works only because all landlords observe it; the fair
trade ordinances of Schwegmann and Midcal worked only because
all dealers observed the mandated prices. Indeed, Justice Douglas'
opinion in Schwegmann described the evil of the Louisiana nonsigner provision as mandating a system that resembled horizontal
price fixing, a result that was produced by the compulsion of the
04
Louisiana statutes.
The criteria that Fisher used to decide the validity of the
Berkeley ordinance appear to have been no more well reasoned
than the criteria formulated in Midcal. In each case the Court
reached for a formula that provided a desired result and that
would be consistent with the Court's earlier decisions. The Fisher
101. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
104. 341 U.S. at 389 ("When retailers are forced to abandon price competition, they
are driven into a compact in violation of the spirit of the proviso which forbids 'horizontal'
price fixing.") (emphasis in the original).
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Court had to annex the hybrid-restraint concept to its principal
concerted action criterion in order to formulate an approach that
would be consistent with prior decisions. As in Midcal, the Court
offered no adequate rationale for its approach. Because Fisherrepresents a judicial withdrawal, however, the new formulation is apt
to meet with less severe challenges than did the relatively expansive Midcal state-action criteria.
B.

The Impact of Fisher on Prior Case Law

Under the scheme established by Rice and the state-action
cases, state and local legislation was safe from antitrust attack as
long as it did not impose a market restraint analogous to conduct
that is per se illegal under section one of the Sherman Act. If state
or local legislation did impose such a market restraint, then it
nonetheless would be protected if it passed the Midcal tests. The
Midcal tests in practice protected nearly every kind of state legislation except price fixing laws; these tests protected local legislation as long as it fell under the protective umbrella of state
legislation.
Fisher has altered this arrangement substantially. Fisher protects both state and local legislation from antitrust attack unless
concerted action is present. State or local legislation compelling
parallel action is not sufficient to meet Fisher's concerted action
requirement. Justice Marshall's opinion clearly states that the "unwilling acquiescence" of the Sherman Act combination cases1 05 is
not enough to meet this new preemption requirement.1 06 Because
the Sherman Act is inapplicable unless concerted action is present
and because government acts by command rather than by agreement with those who must obey the law, almost all state and local
legislation has been freed from vulnerability to Sherman Act
preemption.
Justice Marshall left one category of legislation that involves
concerted action within the purview of his restatement of Sherman
Act preemption. "Hybrid" legislation that establishes government
mechanisms for the enforcement of private marketing decisions is
to be treated as involving concerted action. Such legislation, therefore, is vulnerable to a Sherman Act challenge. Justice Marshall
105. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 & n.6 (1968); United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 764 & n. 9 (1984).
106. 106 S.Ct. at 1049.

1282

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1257

correctly observed that the Court previously had invalidated fair
trade statutes in Schwegmann and Midcal that involved such hybrid market restraints.
Although the hybrid nature of a legislatively created market
restraint takes nonfederal legislation out of the category of unilateral action and subjects it to Sherman Act evaluation, the legislation nevertheless may pass muster under the Act. Even legislation
incorporating a hybrid market restraint will survive Sherman Act
attack unless it produces a per se illegal restraint. For example,
although the designation statute at issue in Rice created a hybrid
market restraint, the statute did not replicate per se illegal behavior; such a hybrid restraint thus would survive antitrust challenge
under Fisher.
In summary, except for legislation establishing so-called hybrid restraints, all state and local legislation has been freed from
vulnerability to Sherman Act preemption. Even the hybrid legislation is vulnerable only when it establishes a per se illegal restraint.
Conversely, if legislation establishes a per se hybrid market restraint, then the legislation is invalid; it cannot be saved by the
state-action doctrine. Hybrid restraints such as those involved in
Schwegmann, Midcal, and Rice by their nature cannot pass the
Midcal supervision test and thus cannot receive protection under
the state-action doctrine. Under this analysis, the state-action doctrine that has grown in increasing complexity over the last eleven
years is now dead. It has been replaced by the new restatement of
federal antitrust preemption announced in Fisher.
C.

The Scope of Hybrid Restraints Under Fisher

Fisher arguably may give greater scope to the state-action doctrine of Midcal and related cases than the preceding summary recognizes. Although, after Fisher, Sherman Act preemption issues
only arise in instances of a hybrid market restraint, the hybrid category may be broader than the simple government enforcement of
private designations of resale prices or exclusive distributors involved in Schwegmann, Midcal, and Rice. The hybrid category
may embrace restraints like Parker's, in which producers established and operated marketing controls under a state regulatory
framework.'0 7 Indeed, a broad interpretation of hybrid restraints
would include the price fixing involved in Goldfarb and a utility's
use of a tariff-filing mechanism to impose market restraints, as in
107.

Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Cantor. This broad view of the newly important hybrid category
would leave room for evaluation under the Midcal standards, even
after Fisher. A legislatively imposed restraint would be subjected
to a multistage evaluation. First, a court would have to determine
whether it was a hybrid restraint. If not a hybrid, the restraint
would not be preempted. If a court decided that the restraint was a
hybrid, the court then would determine whether the restraint imposed illegal per se conduct. If not, the restraint would be upheld.
If the restraint was a hybrid that imposed illegal per se conduct,
then the restraint would be subjected to evaluation under the Midcal tests to see whether the state-action doctrine protected it.
The price fixing restraint of Goldfarb and the tariff filing of
Cantor may, like fair trade laws, fail Midcal's supervision test: no
state agency approved of the rates in Goldfarb or (except in a pro
forma way) of the light bulb distribution program in Cantor. The
Goldfarb and Cantor restraints likely would fail the first Midcal
test as well, at least so long as the test was interpreted consistently
with the Court's earlier decisions in those cases. 10 8 In light of the
Court's treatment of Parker, however, it is clear that restraints
such as Parker's will pass the Midcal tests. Not one of the stateaction cases has suggested remotely that the cartel-like restraint
involved in Parkermight not be valid or that its validity should be
rethought. Therefore, a state-established, cartel-like, agricultural
marketing mechanism like the one in Parker,if tested after Fisher,
likely would come out the same way. If deemed to be a hybrid restraint because of producer involvement, that type of hybrid restraint would pass the Midcal state-action tests, including its supervision requirement.
Strong reasons, however, exist for not extending a broad construction to Fisher's category of hybrid restraints. First, Midcal
originated the hybrid category under the rubric of its supervision
requirement in order to reconcile the Court's state-action cases.
Fisher's hybrid restraint category was adopted for the same purpose: to reconcile the Court's decisions invalidating fair trade laws
in Schwegmann and Midcal with the rest of its state-action case
law. Prima facie, the sweep of the Fisher hybrid category and that
of Midcal's supervision requirement appear to be the same.
Second, a broad construction of Fisher's hybrid restrairit category would be purposeless. The class of restraints deemed hybrid
under Fisher ought to be coextensive with the restraints that can108.

See P.

AREEDA

& D. TURNER, supra note 42, at 82.
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not pass the Midcal supervision requirement. No reason exists for
construing Fisher'shybrid category broadly in order to subject restraints to evaluation under the Midcal supervision test if those
restraints by nature will pass that test. Conversely, having a class
of hybrid restraints that will fail that Midcal test is pointless if the
hybrid category itself is broad enough to condemn them directly.
Occam's razor ought to dispense with the evaluation of hybrid restraints under Midcal's supervision requirement. 10 9
It is true that equating Fisher'shybrid restraint category with
the class of restraints that would fail the Midcal supervision requirement also would eliminate further use of the first Midcal test
of clear articulation. That test, however, is best eliminated. It was
responsible for the Boulder fiasco and has been constantly evaded
by the lower federal courts. 1 " The purpose of the clear articulation
requirement is to aid the federal courts in determining whether the
state legislature has approved a market restraint. This question,
however, is essentially a matter of state law. Federal courts have
little excuse for involvement in questions of state allocations of
power to agencies or to municipalities. Moreover, the clear articulation requirement never worked as it was intended. Justice Brennan, who applied the clear articulation requirement against a city
ordinance in Boulder, indicated earlier in Lafayette that a municipality need not "necessarily. . .be able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization before it properly may assert a
Parkerdefense to an antitrust suit." '' This remark is tantamount
to admitting that a policy could be deemed clearly articulated although in fact a court had to extract it from several statutes.
Moreover, the Court itself recently reduced the clear articulation
1 2
requirement to relative meaninglessness.
109. It is possible to contend that the Fisher hybrid category should be construed
broadly in order to expand the scope of restraints that are evaluated under Midcal's clear
articulation requirement. This contention appears most properly directed at restraints
imposed by a subordinate government agency whose authority to issue those restraints is in
issue. See id. at 80, 91.
110. See supra notes, 62-73 and accompanying text.
111. 435 U.S. at 415.
112. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text. The Hallie and Southern Motor
Carriers cases indicated that the clear articulation requirement would be assessed with
guidance from the delegation doctrine of administrative law. These cases also indicated that
the legislature could confer permissive authority upon a municipality or an agency to
impose a substantial market restraint. Together these rulings undercut the rationale provided for the clear articulation requirement in P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 42, at
80-92. The cases also lend support to those lower court decisions which have transformed
that requirement into a fiction. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
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The Ramifications of Fisher v. Berkeley for Municipal
Regulation

The narrow definition of a hybrid restraint eliminates the uncontrolled growth of the state-action doctrine as represented by
the two-pronged test of Midcal. Courts will test municipal legislation by the same standards applied to state legislation. A court will
uphold the legislation unless it involves a hybrid restraint, and if it
involves a hybrid restraint, a court will uphold it if the restraint is
not a per se restraint. Otherwise the legislation will be condemned.
This Article has argued that the Fisher hybrid analysis should
replace entirely the Midcal state-action tests. If the courts do not
accept that position, then the Midcal tests will play only a narrow
role. They will be used to evaluate hybrid restraints under a broad
definition of hybrid that includes any substantial private decisionmaking in a government imposed market restraint. Under this
broader definition of Fisher's hybrid restraint concept, the courts
have some room to apply the line of state-action precedents
stretching from Goldfarb to Hallie, but that room has been narrowed drastically. Indeed, it is a vestigial remnant of a failed policy
of antitrust intrusion into internal state affairs.
Even under a broad definition of a hybrid restraint, the stateaction doctrine is not needed to protect from preemption a municipality that enacts ordinances imposing substantial controls on
markets, so long as government officials alone, without substantial
involvement of private parties, determine the particular restraints
applied. Cities are thus free to adopt rate, price, or rent controls,
and they may limit franchising and otherwise restrict competition
if the restriction is accompanied by government control over rates
or prices. 113
A broad construction of Fisher's hybrid restraint concept restricts a city's ability to establish, within a particular sector of its
economy, a joint government-seller cartel. A city may not involve
private parties in the establishment or operation of a mechanism
that restricts entry or controls prices, unless the city retains ultimate control over the mechanism's operation and can point to a
state statute endorsing the city's regulation of that sector of the
city's economy. This narrow area of possibilities is reserved under
Fisher for application of the Midcal tests and even this narrow
area remains the domain of the Midcal tests only to the extent
113. See e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274,
278 (4th Cir. 1984).
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that a court broadly interprets Fisher's concept of a hybrid restraint. Like states, cities may not use any version of hybrid restraint under which private decisionmaking receives government
enforcement if those restraints impose a regimen of per se illegal
conduct.
For reasons already stated, courts would be unwise to construe
Fisher's hybrid restraint category more broadly than the class of
restraints that would fail the Midcal supervision test. Courts using
the recommended approach would no longer use the clear articulation requirement. Federal antitrust preemption of municipal regulation would then be governed by standards that were coextensive
with the standards governing preemption of state regulation.
V. Parker Reevaluated: A Legislative Proposal for the
Intersection of Federal Antitrust Policy with State and Local
Regulation
A.
1.

A Need for a Legislative Initiative

The Failure of the Judicially Developed State-Action
Doctrine

Parker1 4 was the Supreme Court's first substantial attempt to
reconcile the federal antitrust laws with the demands of federalism. In Parkerthe Court achieved that reconciliation by exempting
"state" action from the Sherman Act. The rash of cases involving
the state-action issue in recent years-especially as applied to municipal governments-demonstrates the difficulty courts face in determining what constitutes state, as opposed to local government,
action. The state-action concept as it evolved through Halliel" 5
and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference"' demanded re7
evaluation and rearticulation. The Court in Fisher v. Berkeley"
effectively met this demand. With the Fisher decision the Court
finally achieved the possibility of a modicum of doctrinal stability.
Under the wisest construction of that case, the federal antitrust
laws will preempt only that state and local legislation that imposes
hybrid restraints compelling illegal per se behavior.
The Court's venture into the application of the federal antitrust laws to the states thus has failed. The Midcal standards,
which the Court finally formulated after exhaustive effort, have
114.
115.
116.
117.

317
105
105
106

U.S. 341 (1943).
S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
S. Ct. 1721 (1985).
S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
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proved impossible to administer. In Fisher v. Berkeley the Court
admitted defeat. Henceforth, almost all state and local market restraints will be upheld apart from the narrow hybrid category. Although the law will be stable, stability will be purchased at the
expense of the Sherman Act's free market policies. This result is
the best available under the circumstances. Society would benefit
from an extension of free markets, but the courts have proved incapable of reconciling the national free market policy with due respect for state and local autonomy.
2.

The Substantive Factors Underlying the Court's
Development of the State-Action Doctrine
(a) Governmental Inroads Into the Free Market

The Court's ill-fated venture into antitrust review of state and
municipal regulation was motivated by its appreciation of the substantial threat that nonfederal legislation poses to free market policies. In Hallie, as well as in the earlier Boulder"8 and Lafayette"9
cases, the Court recognized the threat to free market policies posed
by the parochial interests of municipalities. 120 Indeed, these opinions may have reflected the view of many economists that the most
dangerous forms of trade restraint are government imposed entry
barriers and other forms of regulation.' 2 ' Only government imposed restrictions are impervious to erosion by market forces.
These opinions also may have expressed the Court's recognition
that local governments are peculiarly prone to interest group pressures for the creation of private benefits at public expense. Finally,
the Court may have believed that federal antitrust policy was powerless to constrain state government imposed market restraints,
but that federal policy nonetheless could be shaped to curtail market restraints imposed by local governments.
(b) State Autonomy
Although its state-action decisions are subject to criticism for
undue intrusion into state and local affairs, the Court did recognize
a need to bend the antitrust laws to accomodate the states' conflicting economic regulatory policies. Indeed, the Court's attempts
118.
119.
120.
121.

455 U.S. 40 (1982).
435 U.S. 389 (1978).
See 105 S. Ct. at 1721; 455 U.S. at 51; 435 U.S. at 408.

See, e.g., M.

FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM

HORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS

125-26 (1982); see also W. GELL(1956).
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to reconcile these conflicting federal and state interests account for
the complexity and inadministrability of its state-action
precedents.
The Court's two Midcal tests1 22 were an attempt to achieve
the desired accomodation of federal and state policies. The "clear
articulation" test recognized that a state properly could adopt any
economic policy that it wished. The state-action decisions, however, required a state that adopted a regulatory policy that conflicted with the Sherman Act to state the conflicting policy clearly.
The clear articulation requirement was designed to ensure that the
state legislature indeed had adopted the conflicting policy. The
test was designed to help the federal courts defer to state policies
without bending the antitrust laws for policies devised by lower
ranking officials or invented in litigation by imaginative lawyers.
The supervision requirement also recognized that states properly
could adopt regulatory policies that conflicted with the Sherman
Act. The supervision requirement attempted to ensure that the
state, through its instrumentalities, took responsibility for the restrictive and anticompetitive facets of its market regulation.
(c) A Need for Legislation
Only Congress can provide standards under which the federal
antitrust laws test state or local legislation. The Court has demonstrated the judiciary's inability to formulate administratable standards. It is appropriate, therefore, for Congress to articulate standards for achieving an optimum reconciliation of federal antitrust
policies with the deference due to the states.
B.

The State-Action Problem Reexamined
1. Parker Reexamined

Because the state-action doctrine seeks to reconcile a national
policy in favor of free markets with a deference to the states'
proper governmental roles, the doctrine's structure should rest
upon a carefully delineated balance of those policies. This careful
delineation was absent from Parker, the foundation upon which
the state-action doctrine rested until the decision in Fisher v.
Berkeley. In Parker the state of California had established a restrictive marketing program for raisins, a crop grown in California
and sold nationally. California imposed marketing restrictions that
122.

See supra text accompanying notes 39-49.
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burdened the national market with supracompetitive prices while
providing the benefit of the supracompetitive prices to its own
growers. Such a marketing program directly conflicts with the national policy in favor of free markets. That conflict was muted in
the Parker case, however, because the California marketing program was apparently consistent with the policies of the federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. In general, however, in the
absence of a federal regulatory policy that legitimates state action,
a state's role in a federal system does not include establishing a
marketing mechanism that penalizes the rest of the country for the
benefit of in-state producers.12 3 Such overreaching regulation is especially inappropriate in light of the historic concerns underlying
the United States' constitutional structure: the present federal system was established largely to eliminate economic exploitation of
some states by others through tariffs, duties, and other preferences
for domestic industries.
These considerations indicate that the Sherman Act issue in
Parker should have been decided differently. The Court either
should have ruled that the federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act implicitly exempted analogous state programs from the
Sherman Act, or it should have invalidated the California prorate
act. The Court should have ruled that any state regulation that
imposes significant anticompetitive restrictions on a national market (i.e., raises price significantly above the competitive level or
significantly restricts supply in the market) for the benefit of instate producers is in conflict with the Sherman Act and hence invalid. Indeed, the Court should have adopted an even more expansive view and ruled that any state regulation that produces a significant restrictive effect on price or supply in a market extending
substantially beyond the enacting state's boundaries, and that
therefore burdens nonresidents with the restraints, conflicts with
the Sherman Act and hence is preempted.
It may be too late for the Court to arrive at such a sensible
result. Its obvious failure to achieve a stable and consistent approach to the state-action doctrine in eleven decisions since 1975,
coupled with its present abandonment of the case law created by
those decisions, certainly would counsel against the Court's further
attempting to rewrite the state-action doctrine. Any successful at123. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 42 at 126-27 (suggesting that in the
absence of the federal policy embodied in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, the
California prorate law in Parker should have been condemned under the commerce clause).
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tempt to eliminate the deference that Parker requires federal antitrust laws to accord to state regulatory policies imposing extraterritorial anticompetitive restraints must be legislative. Should
Congress wish to confine the sweep of a state's regulatory policies
to its own borders, Congress has the power to do so; drafting such
a statute is a straightforward task presenting no significant
24
problems.1
2.

A Broad Reconciliation Between Federal Antitrust Policy
and State Autonomy Over Internal Economic Policy

Although the suggested approach would provide an intellectually coherent structure for a state-action exemption from federal
antitrust policy in cases like Parker,most of the state-action cases
have involved state or local governments imposing restraints that
primarily affected the state's own residents. Goldfarb, Bates, and
Hoover v. Ronwin 12 5 involved restraints on the provision of legal
services, restraints that generally affect markets confined within
the regulating state. Cantor involved a local market in light bulbs.
New Motor Vehicle Board involved a restraint upon in-state automobile distribution, the principal burden of which the state's own
residents bore. Schwegmann and Midcal involved fair trade regulation, which primarily burdened the enacting state's own residents. Boulder involved a local (and therefore in-state) restraint.
Although the facts of Lafayette suggest that the anticompetitive
conduct affected an extramunicipal market, the facts are not clear
whether the conduct affected the operation of a market extending
substantially beyond Louisiana. Fisher v. Berkeley involved local
rent control, which burdened local property owners. In these cases
the Court wrestled with the applicability of the federal antitrust
laws to restraints that primarily affected residents of the regulating
state. Although the Court always insisted that a state ultimately
could choose its own economic policies, the Court tried, ultimately
unsuccessfully, to condition the manner in which the state adopted
and exercised a nonfree market regulatory policy.
This Article proposes that market restraints adopted by a
state or its political subdivision whose burden falls primarily upon
state residents be left to that state's political processes and hence
be exempted from the Sherman Act, provided that certain conditions are met. These conditions are designed to heighten the visi124.
125.

See infra Section 2 of the statutory proposal.
467 U.S. 558 (1984).
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bility of the anticompetitive and restrictive aspects of the state or
local regulation as well as its anticipated benefits. This heightened
visibility will assist the state or local electorate to assess fully the
benefits and burdens of economic policies that differ from the national free market policy.'
This approach is workable and respects the opposing concerns set forth in the Supreme Court's case
law. The proposal addresses the Court's perceived need to bend
the Sherman Act to accommodate "state" economic regulation and
local regulation adequately endorsed by the state political process.
In seeking to reach an accommodation between state autonomy
and the federal antitrust laws through the full utilization of state
political processes, this approach seeks to attain through legislation results that earlier commentators sought to reach by means of
127
the now discredited judicial avenue.
3.

The Background for a New Approach to the "Clear
Articulation" Requirement

The approach that the Court has worked out to determine
whether the state-action exemption applies includes the requirement that conflicting state policy be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed.' 1 28 Although this requirement is applied
easily to state legislation that on its face contemplates the substitution of regulation for a free market, applying the standard to determine whether a local government is entitled to the state-action
exemption has caused significant difficulties.
The Court's requirement of clear articulation, however, has
not been arbitrary. Underlying that requirement is the ultimate
premise of the state-action doctrine: that absent a massive and impractical assertion of federal control over state and local affairs,
the Court is essentially powerless to prevent the states from adopt126. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 42 (1982) (following M. FIORINA. RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS
(1981)). Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson suggest that "[miost citizens appear to be relatively insensitive to the welfare consequences of most public decisions, especially those decisions that allocate private, divisible benefits to others." Publicly identifying the costs and
benefits of the regulatory legislation of states and their political subdivisions would aid the
relevant electorate and their representatives to evaluate regulatory proposals from an
adequate information perspective.
127. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 42, at 80-92; Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action
Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U.L. REv. 1099, 1123-24 (1981).
128. 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
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ing regulatory policies that are inconsistent with the Sherman Act.
The Court, of course, can prohibit a carefully defined class of legislation such as the hybrid restraints referred to in Fisher.The federal courts, however, cannot impose greater substantive prohibitions upon the range of state and local legislation without disabling
the states from carrying out concededly proper governance. The
Court can intrude at most only by imposing procedural requirements upon the manner and the methods by which the states
adopt and administer their inconsistent regulatory policies. The
Court took this approach when it evaluated state and local legislation under the twin tests of the Midcal opinion. 12 9 Even when the
Court purported to extend the reach of the antitrust laws further
into the affairs of local governments than into the affairs of state
governments, the Court acknowledged that it could not prevent
the state legislature from conferring upon subordinate units of government the power to adopt and to administer regulatory policies
at odds with the Sherman Act's free market policy. Again, the only
constraint that the Court tried to impose involved the manner in
which the state legislature conferred that power.
The Court originally imposed the clear articulation requirement to ensure that an exemption from the antitrust laws would
be provided only to anticompetitive policies that a state had in
fact adopted. The requirement attempted to keep the exemption
within its proper limits. After insisting in Cantor that an exemption from the antitrust laws be no broader than necessary to accommodate state concerns,1 30 Justice Blackmun relied in Bates
upon the state's clear articulation, in lawyer disciplinary rules, of
its regulatory concerns as assurance that the federal antitrust laws
deferred no further than necessary:
The disciplinary rules reflect a clear articulation of the State's policy with
regard to professional behavior. Moreover. . . the rules are subject to pointed
reexamination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in enforcement proceedings. Our concern that federal policy is being unnecessarily and
inappropriately subordinated to state policy is reduced in such a situation; we
deem it significant that the state policy is so clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervision is so active.1sl

Although the clear articulation requirement has become problematic as a measure of state authorization of municipalities' adoption
129. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
130. See 428 U.S. at 597. This no-broader-than-necessary approach to the state-action
exemption was repudiated in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 1727 n.21 (1985).
131. 433 U.S. at 362.
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of anticompetitive local regulation, the requirement's function always has been an identification function: to identify the anticompetitive policies adopted by the states in order to measure how far
the federal antitrust laws should bend to accommodate those
policies.
4.

Two Facets of the Clear Articulation Requirement.

This Article has shown the clear articulation requirement to
possess two facets. First, if a state-action exemption is to be recognized at all, clear articulation is one of the few conditions that
properly can be attached to the exemption. The logic of recognizing a state-action exemption implies that the choice of an anticompetitive state economic policy must be left to the internal political
processes of each state. Furthermore, as a practical matter, those
processes must be accorded the ultimate right to confer upon
subordinate units of government and political subdivisions the
power to adopt anticompetitive local economic policies. Second,
the clear articulation requirement serves an identification function:
by aiding in the definition of the state economic policy, it defines
132
the antitrust exemption.
5. A Third Facet of the Clear Articulation Requirement.
Although never mentioned by the Court, a third facet of the
clear articulation requirement emerges from an analysis of the first
two facets: a clear articulation requirement stringently applied
would expose anticompetitive state policies to the state electorate.
The more clearly a state articulates the anticompetitive dimensions of its economic policies, the better able is the state's political
process to determine whether the benefits arising from those policies outweigh the burdens. Professor Page, writing in support of
Midcal in 1981, argued that a clear articulation requirement was
desirable because it brought trade restraints before the state legislature and thereby subjected the restraints to political review. 13 A
similar view is implicit in the arguments of Professors Areeda and
Turner on behalf of a clear statement requirement.13 4 Furthermore, if the state-action doctrine were reinterpreted to apply only
132. See e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TURNER supra note 42, at 80-81, 91. Areeda and Turner
believe that a clear statement requirement will resolve ambiguities that otherwise might
surround the assertion of an anticompetitive regulation by a subordinate governmental
entity.
133. Page, supra, note 127, at 1106.

134. P. AREEDA & D.

TURNER,

supra note 42, at 92.
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when the restraint's burden falls primarily upon the economy of
the state adopting the anticompetitive regulatory program, the instate political process would be particularly qualified to weigh the
benefits and burdens.
6.

The Proposal

The difficulties that the courts have encountered in applying
the clear articulation test demonstrate its unworkability in its judicially developed form. This Article therefore proposes legislation
that would redefine the state-action exemption in terms that, as
applied to governmentally imposed restraints whose impact is primarily internal to the regulating state, largely consist of an elaboration of the clear articulation requirement. The proposal also goes
to the core of the difficulty that has underlain the judicial development of the state-action defense; the proposal limits that defense
to restraints that are internal to the state responsible for them.
This modification of the state-action defense not only best accords
with the proper role of a state in a federal system, but it also eliminates the bias that might infect state political processes were they
to weigh in-state benefits against out-of-state burdens. In so doing,
the proposal prepares the way for a clegislative redefinition of the
clear articulation requirement.
As incorporated in the proposal, the required articulations are
faithful to the concerns expressed by Justice Brennan in Lafayette
and Boulder regarding the potential for anticompetitive restraints
represented by thousands of units of local government. This proposal is also consistent with regulatory approaches that have passed
the test of experience. Thus, it is consistent with the Congress' approaches in the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts. 13 5 These Acts
gave carefully limited scope to exemptions from the federal antitrust laws in order to accommodate state concerns. The Acts exempted from the federal antitrust laws state "fair trade" laws authorizing vertical price fixing, but only under carefully confined
conditions designed to ensure the presence of interbrand competition. The Acts effectively required these conditions to be incorporated into the exempted state laws themselves. 3 6 By requiring cer135. 50 Stat. 693 (1937); 66 Stat. 632 (1952).
136. The technique employed in both the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts was to
exempt from the federal antitrust laws a carefully delineated class of resale price maintenance contracts so long as contracts "of that description" were made lawful by state law. 50
Stat. 693 (1937); 66 Stat. 632 (1952). State laws, accordingly, carefully copied the phrasing
of the federal acts. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 369-a (McKinney 1968) (repealed 1975).
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tain legislative findings and by requiring an official identification of
burdens and benefits, this Article's proposal makes use of techniques widely employed in environmental and other forms of regulation. 137 Finally, this proposal contemplates subjecting state and
local legislation to a form of antitrust review consistent with the
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, but significantly broader
than the level of review to which the Court retreated in Fisher v.
Berkeley. In the Local Government Antitrust Act the Congress exempted local governments from liability in damages for antitrust
violations. The Congress, however, consciously refrained from exempting either state or local legislation from preemption by the
Sherman Act, whose standards the Court had then most recently
expressed in Boulder. In short, this proposal is traditional in its
structure and sensitive both to the free market policies underlying
the federal antitrust laws and to the inherent freedom of state and
local governments to substitute various forms of economic regulation for the free market within their jurisdictions.
This Article therefore proposes that Congress enact the following statute:
THE STATE-ACTION EXEMPTION ACT

Section 1. For purposes of this Act:
(1) the term "law of a state or political subdivision thereof"
means any law, regulation, ordinance, or other requirement enacted, adopted, or otherwise issued by any state or political subdivision of a state or any agency or instrumentality of any state or
political subdivision of a state;
(2) the term "antitrust laws" has the meaning given it in section 1 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15), except that such term
includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (14 U.S.C.
§ 45) to the extent that said section 5 applies to unfair methods of
competition;
(3) the term "anticompetitive effect" means (a) a substantial
reduction in the supply of goods or services from the level that
would have been offered in a competitive market, or (b) a substantial increase in the price level for goods or services over the level
that would have prevailed in a competitive market;
(4) the term "deadweight social loss ''13s means the value (in137. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982).
138. This economic term of art is employed in the draft bill to focus attention upon
the social costs of restrictive legislation. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, ECONoMIcs 486 n.10 (11th

1296

VANDERBILT LAW' REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1257

cluding lost consumer surplus) in goods or services that would have
been produced or sold in a competitive market but that are not
produced because of the anticompetitive effects of the law of a
state or a political subdivision thereof.
Section 2. Except as provided in Section 4, any law of a state
or political subdivision thereof that imposes an anticompetitive effect upon a market extending substantially beyond the boundaries
of the state is invalid. A market shall not be deemed to extend
substantially beyond the boundaries of a state if a majority of the
persons burdened by the anticompetitive effect are residents of the
state or persons who become or expect to become residents of the
state.
Section 3. Except as provided in Section 2, the federal antitrust laws shall not apply to any law of a state or political subdivision thereof, when the following conditions are met:
(1) The law shall contain the following findings:
(a) a finding identifying each intended or anticipated anticompetitive effect
to be produced by the law;
(b) a finding identifying: (i) the class or classes of persons anticipated to be
benefited by the law; (ii) the class or classes of persons upon whom the burden of any anticompetitive effect is anticipated to fall; and (iii) the geographical locations (including identification by state and political subdivisions
thereof) where such burdens and benefits are anticipated to fall; and
(c) a finding estimating for the first ten years of the law's operation (or such
lesser period if the law has an earlier expiration date): (i) the economic benefit to each benefited class and geographical area; (ii) the economic burden to
each burdened class and geographical area; and (iii) an estimate of the "deadweight social loss" anticipated to be produced by the law.

(2) The findings required to be made in subparagraphs (a)
through (c) of this Section shall be remade at the expiration of
each ten year period or at any time the duration of the law is
extended.
(3) The findings specified in this Section shall be succinctly
stated. Estimates contained in findings shall be: (a) based upon
relevant data reasonably available to the authority promulgating
the law; and (b) based upon methodology that at the time employed is currently in use or acceptable by professionals making
comparable determinations. All such estimates shall be presumed
to have been made in the manner specified herein, unless the contrary is proved by clear and convincing evidence.
ed. 1980); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE & ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 17-18
(2d ed. 1980). The purpose of the proposed statute could be fulfilled without using this

particular term.
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(4) The law shall provide for the governmental supervision of
the principal anticompetitive effects produced by the law.
Section 4. The federal antitrust laws shall not apply to any
law of a state or political subdivision thereof that is in existence at
the effective date of this Act until five years after such date.
This proposal, if enacted, would redefine the relationship between the federal antitrust laws and the regulatory laws of states
and local governments. If applied to the facts of Parkerv. Brown,
it would produce a different result than the Court reached in 1942,
unless the Court construed the federal laws governing agriculture
to create an antitrust exemption. On the Parker v. Brown facts, a
preexisting prorate law could not survive longer than five years after the proposal's enactment. Enacting the proposal would eliminate a state's ability to create anticompetitive market restrictions
benefiting its own producers at the expense of other states'
consumers.
With the exception of fair trade laws and similar legislation,
the proposal would leave virtually all other market restraints to
the political processes of the states. Because the proposal incorporates the Midcal supervision requirement, the Sherman Act would
continue to preempt fair trade laws, as it has under Schwegmann
and Midcal and under the hybrid analysis of Fisher v. Berkeley.
Like Fisher, this proposal applies the same tests to local legislation as are applied to state legislation. Like Fisher, this proposal
will not tolerate fair trade legislation. Unlike Fisher,however, this
proposal does impose limited federal antitrust oversight of state
and local regulatory legislation. In imposing this limited oversight,
the proposal attempts to further the free market goals embodied in
the Court's Lafayette and Boulder decisions without falling prey
to the administrative difficulties that those cases engendered.
The proposal answers several objections to Lafayette and
Boulder. First, although it uses the clear articulation requirement
formulated in the Court's state-action cases, the proposal substitutes a legislatively defined clear statement for a judicially mandated amorphous statement. In so doing, the proposal makes the
requirement administratively workable. Legislatures know in advance what is required of them, and courts have sufficiently precise
standards to enforce. Second, critics' assertions that the federal
courts have intruded into the states' internal affairs will be more
muted under the enacted proposal than they were under Lafayette
and Boulder. Under the proposal the states and their subdivisions
can enact virtually any in-state market restriction they desire, and,
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contrary to the standards that prevailed under Lafayette and
Boulder, no more stringent test applies to local subdivisions than
to state governments.
Most importantly, the proposal gives to the clear articulation
requirement a new function that respects the autonomy of the
states' political processes. In the pre-Fisher case law, the Court did
not provide an adequate rationale for its clear articulation requirement. The requirement's function could be inferred, but the Court
never explained its function sufficiently to guide application by the
lower courts. Indeed, the clear articulation requirement appeared
to be a device for federal intrusion into the states' internal allocation of governmental power. Under the proposal, the clear articulation requirement performs an unambiguous role that is visibly consonant with state autonomy. Under the proposal, the clear
articulation requirement's function is to assist a state's political
processes to reflect the will of its electorate. Federal intrusion is
reduced to a minimum: the proposal requires only that the state's
own people be told about the expected economic consequences of
proposed legislation.
Finally, the role of the clear articulation requirement under
the proposal provides a comprehensible reconciliation of the policies of federal antitrust law and state autonomy over internal affairs. The federal antitrust laws are designed to protect the public
from monopolies and cartels. The proposal ensures that the public
receives this protection unless the public chooses otherwise
through the political process. The clear articulation requirement
ensures that any governmental decision to abandon the free market is made in a manner designed to inform the affected public
about the expected benefits and burdens of the change.
This public information requirement ought not to be seen as
federal intrusion. The Congress could extend the Sherman Act
broadly to restrict the states' substantive powers to regulate. Indeed, strong arguments support such congressional action as it is
widely believed that state and local special-interest regulation creates significant social waste. Moreover, the Congress implicitly
sanctioned the federal judiciary's equity review of local legislation
under Boulder's standards when it enacted the Local Government
Antitrust Act of 1984.139 Little doubt remains, therefore, that the
federal interest in furthering free markets legitimately extends to
139.
1984).

Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. II,
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ensuring that, when free markets are abandoned, the affected public is informed about the expected results. Finally, because the proposal is legislative, the minimal intrusion into state political
processes that it requires will be seen as more legitimate than the
judicial intrusion in state-action cases.
VI.

THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PROPOSAL TO ALTERNATIVES

A.

Professor Wiley's Capture Theory

1. Wiley's Criteria
In a recent issue of the HarvardLaw Review, Professor John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., proposed a new approach to Sherman Act preemption of state and local regulation, which he termed a "capture"
theory. 140 Under Wiley's proposal, state and local regulation would
be preempted when the following four criteria were met: (1) the
regulation restrained market rivalry; (2) no federal antitrust exemption protected the regulation; (3) the regulation did not respond directly to a substantial market inefficiency; and (4) the regulation originated from the "decisive" political efforts of producers
who stand to profit from its competitive restraint.14 1
The first three of Wiley's criteria are not problematic. The
first two are conditions for the application of the federal antitrust
laws in any case. Those laws do not apply unless market rivalry is
restrained, either by agreements among market actors or by the
substitution of a monopolistic actor for the rivalry of competitors.
By definition the antitrust laws do not apply to activity exempted
from their application. Wiley's third condition identifies a kind of
state or local legislation widely recognized as immune from antitrust attack: a regulation that reduces inefficiency furthers the
same ends as a federal antitrust law and therefore is not preempted. 42 A typical example of such a law is the conferral of an
140. Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1986).
In addition to the proposals discussed in text, Professor Herbert Havenkamp and John A.
Mackerron III have proposed that economic regulation be performed by the optimal regulator. Under this test, the federal courts would pass upon the question as to whether economic
effects of the regulation were contained within the political boundaries of the governmental
entity performing the regulation. See Hovenkamp & Mackerron, MunicipalRegulation and
Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 719, 774-779 (1985). This proposal is consistent with the proposal of this Article but it lacks the safeguards proposed here to ensure
that the political processes of the regulating unit of government respond to an informed
electorate.
141. Id. at 743.
142. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 125-27 (7th
Cir. 1982). In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 1983),
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exclusive franchise upon a so-called "natural" monopoly, a business whose economies increase indefinitely with output. Public
utility regulation sometimes meets this description. Building more
than one utility in a circumstance of increasing returns to scale
would be wasteful. Government prohibition of a second utility's
entry fosters efficient production.
Wiley's fourth condition, however, is problematic. Wiley would
invalidate state or local regulation that results from the "decisive"
efforts of producers who benefit from the market restraint. Such
an approach raises a hornet's nest of problems, as Wiley himself
admits. Professor Wiley's approach does not furnish adequate
guidance for distinguishing producer capture from capture by
other special interests. Although Wiley identifies "producer" capture as the basis for preemption, he surely would include "buyer"
capture as well, for no sound basis exists for favoring monopsonies
over monopolies. Yet Wiley favors exempting the recent rent control ordinance involved in Fisher from antitrust preemption. He
defends his position on the ground that applying his proposed capture approach requires "the exploitation of the many by the few,"
rather than a consumer cartel of many renters penalizing a smaller
number of landlords. 14 3 This many-versus-few analysis may work
less easily, however, in cases displaying a lesser disparity between
the benefited and burdened interests.
Wiley's approach also would involve the judiciary in reviewing
the acceptability of lobbying and in penalizing successful lobbying.
Wiley recommends proving capture by evidence of lobbying. He
notes,'4 4 but does not discuss, the implications of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,' 4 5 a doctrine that places lobbying outside of the
cert. denied sub nom., Gulf Coast Cable Television Co. v. Affiliated Capital Corp. 106 S. Ct.
788 (1986), the Fifth Circuit conceded that a city's grant of an exclusive franchise in a natural-monopoly market was not precluded by the antitrust laws, but the court held that
pregrant competition among applicants was required. See also Central Telecommunications,
Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 1986-2 Trade Cases 67,247 (8th Cir. 1986).
143. Wiley, supra note 140, at 768.
144. Id. at 772-73. Wiley seeks to avoid the application of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine by limiting the use of capture theory against public defendants to declarations of invalidity and injunctions against enforcement. Id. at 773. Yet Wiley would penalize lobbying
activity by invalidating the legislation that was enacted in response to it. He would make
the criterion for invalidation the identification of the lobbyists or the interests that they
represented. Indeed, in Noerr itself, the Court explicitly condemned a capture theory such
as the one propounded by Wiley. See Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noer Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 137-38, n.17 (1961).
145. In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), the Court ruled that a combination of business firms in a lobbying campaign does
not fall within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, even though the objective of the cam-
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concerns of the Sherman Act. The doctrine also reflects the constitutional concerns connected with the proper functioning of governmental branches and people's ability freely to communicate with
their representatives and other officials. 14 6 Because the Court already has held that the Sherman Act is not concerned with lobbying activities, even lobbying activities directed at persuading the
legislature to enact legislation imposing anticompetitive restraints
on competitors, Wiley's recommendation conflicts with the spirit, if
not the letter, of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.
It is difficult to imagine an activity more intrusive into the political processes of the states than the federal courts deciding
whether an interest group, through its lobbying efforts, had exerted too much influence upon the enactment of state legislation.
Such a judicial decision would be tantamount to ruling that the
right of petition was exercised too effectively. Lobbying is not a
suspect practice that the courts must check whenever the lobbyists
successfully convince the legislators of the justness of their cause.
As the Court has recognized, lobbying serves purposes other than
the interests of the lobbyists.1 47 It is a primary means through
which the legislators inform themselves about issues before them.
A legislator need not be captured by a lobbyist to make use of the
information that the lobbyist supplies or indeed to be persuaded of
the rightness of his cause. Although legislation imposing restrictions upon the operation of the free market often may be unwise, a
state or local legislature should not require federal judicial permission to enact such legislation.
The results of a serious attempt to implement Wiley's recommendations are not easy to predict. On the one hand, his recommendations carry the potential to destroy lobbying by special interest groups interested in market regulation economically
beneficial to them. Indeed, under the facial effects analysis that
Professor Wiley advocates, economic regulation that benefits a
small interest group would be prima facie forbidden whether or not
it resulted from lobbying. On the other hand, Wiley would allow a
government to rebut a prima facie case of capture by showing that
paign is the enactment of anticompetitive legislation. The Court elaborated this doctrine in
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and in California Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
146. See 365 U.S. at 137; see also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508, 510-511 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-670
(1965).
147. See 365 U.S. at 139.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1302

[Vol. 39:1257

its legislators "did in fact consider public interest arguments.

' 148

Because most sophisticated legislators would be aware of the need
at least formally to consider "public interest arguments," how any
prima facie case would not be effectively rebuttable is unclear. And
if rebuttal is easy, the whole capture analysis appears to be an exercise without a point.
Finally, Wiley's recommendation that capture be proved by
analyzing the facial effects of regulatory legislation would extend
antitrust review deeply into state affairs, far beyond the intrusion
contemplated by even the most extreme reading of Boulder. Wiley
would permit proof of producer capture not only by direct evidence of decisive producer support, but also by a facial effects
showing. 149 A facial effects showing would be made by analyzing
the regulation to determine the identity of the classes that the regulation benefited and burdened. Wiley illustrates the facial effects
approach with a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting corporations
from opening new drug stores unless all the corporation's stockholders are licensed pharmacists. He deduces that the statute most
likely resulted from the lobbying efforts of small druggists seeking
a shield against chain store competition. 150 The statute, according
to Wiley, was thus the result of capture and should be exposed to
federal antitrust review.
Wiley's capture approach would maximize federal intrusion
into state affairs. A facial effects showing potentially would subject
all state and local regulation to antitrust scrutiny, an extension of
federal concern vastly broader than any contemplated by even the
most interventionist case law. Wiley's facial effects test for capture
produces a positive reading whenever a small number of producers
benefit from the market restriction. Because this result is a common circumstance (as the cases involving exclusive franchises for
taxi companies, entry restrictions on auto dealers, and development restrictions demonstrate), Wiley's approach potentially
would subject a vast amount of state and local regulation to antitrust preemption.
148. Wiley, supra note 140, at 771. Wiley would restrict rebuttal to evidence "of actual
legislative influence or consideration." Id. at 772.
149.

Id. at 771.

150. Id.
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Wiley's Approach Compared with this Article's Proposal

The proposal contained in this Article defers to state political
processes on decisions to substitute regulation for the free market.
The proposal's only restrictions on the states are that they may
not impose monopolistic restraints extraterritorially and that legislation that imposes substantial market restraints must be accompanied by findings of the anticipated benefits and burdens. Underlying these provisions is the premise that no reason prevents the
citizens of any state or subdivision, acting through their representatives, from surrendering the protections against monopolistic
market restrictions that the federal antitrust laws provide. This
Article's proposal mandates federal deference to the legislative
processes of the states and local governments. The federal interest
in maintaining free markets is manifested only in the prohibition
of states' imposing extraterritorial monopolistic restraints and in
the requirement of legislative findings on burdens and benefits to
ensure that the electorate is informed about the anticipated economic consequences of market-restricting legislation.
By contrast, Wiley's approach embodies an extreme form of
what he himself calls "antitrust imperialism.' 1 51 All state or local
economic regulation that benefits a small class at the expense of a
larger number would be vulnerable to Sherman Act preemption.
Moreover, Wiley proposes that in doubtful cases evidence on lobbying activity be introduced into court and evaluated for the activity's "decisiveness" in the state legislative processes.' 52 The federal
courts in effect would scrutinize the responsiveness of legislators to
segments of the electorate. This scrutiny would involve a vastly
greater judicial intrusion into state affairs than was called for by
Midcal, Lafayette, and Boulder.
B. Professor Page's Capture Theory
After the Court's decision in Midcal, Professor Willilam H.
53
Page offered a rationale for the clear articulation standard.
Drawing from scholarly literature that suggested that regulatory
agencies are more susceptible to capture by special interests than
151. See id. at 767. Wiley is aware of an approach similar to the one proposed in this
Article, but he dismisses it as not "worth the candle." As applied to a proposed statute such
as the one set forth in this Article, his conclusion is not supported adequately. See id. at
744-45 & n.147.
152. Id. at 769-770.
153. Page, supra note 127.

1304

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1257

are legislatures, Page argued that the clear articulation requirement beneficially prevented state regulatory agencies from initiating substantial market restraints. Instead, the requirement forced
states to act through their legislatures when they imposed substantial restrictions on markets. Page argued that use of the legislative
process subjected economic regulation to greater scrutiny, potentially including the scrutiny of the electorate. Moreover, legislatively enacted market restrictions enjoyed a higher degree of underlying legitimacy than restrictions enacted by politically
unresponsive regulatory agencies. In Page's view, only the restraints produced by the legislative process merited the deference
of the federal antitrust laws.
Page's approach properly recognizes that federal antitrust policy must bend to conflicting state economic policies. His approach
also recognizes that the federal courts, acting in the name of antitrust laws, practically cannot do more than impose procedural restrictions upon the states. His proffered approach to the Midcal
clear articulation requirement, however, is faulty in several respects. First, although Page would impose procedural restrictions
upon the states when they adopt market-restricting legislation, he
accepts the basic legitimacy of Parker. Page wants to force the
states to use the legislative process to impose market restrictions
because that process is politically accountable. Yet state legislative
action is not truly politically accountable when it imposes market
restraints that primarily burden nonresidents. Second, the politically unresponsive nature of regulatory agencies does not explain
why the clear articulation requirement should apply to cities. Because the application of the clear articulation requirement to cities
produced the morass from which the Court since has been trying
to extricate itself, Page's failure to provide an adequate rationale
for his support of the requirement's application to cities is a serious deficiency. Finally, a judicially imposed clear articulation requirement does not work. Unless the federal antitrust laws are to
withdraw entirely, the interaction between the federal antitrust
laws and economic regulation by states and local governments
must be governed by legislation setting forth in detail the limits of
state and local regulation.
C. The Approach of Professors Areeda and Turner
In 1978 Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner argued
that a clear statement requirement was implicit in the Court's re-
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cent decision in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.15 4 and that other
state-action decisions also supported the requirement. 55 Areeda
and Turner argued that a clear statement requirement was the
best way to reconcile federal antitrust policy with state autonomy:
[a] clear statement requirement is the best approach because it ensures that
the strong federal policy embodied in the antitrust laws will not be set aside
where not intended by the state, and yet also guarantees that the state will
not be prevented by the antitrust laws alone from supplanting those laws as
158
long as it makes its purpose clear.

The Court in effect followed their recommendation two years later
in Midcal by formally adopting the suggested requirement.15 7 Experience, however, has shown that the judicially mandated clear
statement requirement that Areeda and Turner recommended does
not work.
Although the judicial clear statement of Areeda and Turner
has not worked successfully, their analyses of the state-action
problem offer important insights. Various aspects of this Article's
legislative proposal, in particular Section 2, find support in the Arreeda and Turner treatise. Commenting upon Parker v. Brown,
Areeda and Turner acknowledged that the substantial market restriction that California imposed on the rest of the nation in order
to benefit its own producers should have invalidated the Act in the
absence of the coinciding federal policy manifested in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. 158 Areeda and Turner, however,
relied upon the commerce clause to reach that result.
In discussing their recommendation for judicial supervision
over the administration of a market restraint, Areeda and Turner
point to a problem: is it at all practical for courts to insist that
state officials make good faith determinations of the data that is or
could be available to them? Areeda and Turner answer in the negative: "There simply is no way to tell if the state has 'looked' hard
enough at the data."'159 This response is obvious. The problem that
they raise cannot be solved by the judiciary acting alone. Ensuring
that the data are before the legislators and their constituents, how154. 429 U.S. 579 (1976).
155. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 42, at 91-92.
156. Id. at 91.
157. In its 1980 Midcal decision, the Court also adopted a supervision requirement.
Both the clear statement requirement and the supervision requirement had been recommended by Areeda and Turner two years earlier. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 42, at
71-73, 91-92.
158. Id. at 126-27.
159. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 42, at 75.
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ever, is entirely possible. Impact statements of various kinds provide analogues for the legislative findings requirements set forth in
Section 3 of the proposal.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Fisher v. Berkeley the Supreme Court essentially gave up
its attempt to use the antitrust laws to probe the anticompetitive
restraints imposed by states and local governments. The Court's
new approach is an improvement over its predecessor, because the
older approach did not work. Prior to Fisher the Court was deciding an undue number of state-action cases without formulating
workable standards, and the lower courts were evading the mandates of the Supreme Court precedents.
This Article contains a legislative proposal designed to govern
the relationship between the federal free market policies embodied
in the antitrust laws and nonfederal economic regulation. The proposal is workable and ensures that when state and local governments decide to depart from the free market, those decisions will
be made in the light of adequate information about the likely burdens and benefits of those decisions. The proposal addresses the
concerns of other critics and, for reasons set forth above, it is superior to the approaches they have recommended.

